An Evolution in Canadian Judging by Gorman, Wayne K.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Court Review: The Journal of the American 
Judges Association American Judges Association 
2015 
An Evolution in Canadian Judging 
Wayne K. Gorman 
Provincial Court of Newfoundland and Labrador, wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview 
Gorman, Wayne K., "An Evolution in Canadian Judging" (2015). Court Review: The Journal of the American 
Judges Association. 512. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview/512 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Judges Association at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Court Review: The Journal of 
the American Judges Association by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - 
Lincoln. 
Footnotes
1. See R. v. R.E.M., [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, ¶ 8 (Can.).
2. R. v. Burns, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 656, ¶ 18 (Can.) (citations omitted).
3. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869 (Can.).
4. See R. v. Gagnon, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621, ¶ 12 (Can.). 
5. See R. v. Wolynec, 2015 ONCA 656, 2015 CarswellOnt 14700, 
¶ 54 (Can. Ont.). 
6. Sheppard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, ¶ 33.
7. Id. ¶ 55. The entirety of the trial judge’s reasons consisted of the
following statement (at paragraph 2): “Having considered all the
testimony in this case, and reminding myself of the burden on
the Crown and the credibility of witnesses, and how this is to be
assessed, I find the defendant guilty as charged.”
8. See, e.g., R. v. Szabo, 2002 BCSC 635 (Can. B.C.); R. v. Wojcik,
2002 MBCA 82 (Can. Man.); R. v. Edgett, 2002 NBQB 205 (Can.
N.B.); R. v. Garbauski, 2003 BCSC 487 (Can. B.C); R. v. P.J.C.,
2003 BCCA 332 (Can. B.C.); R. v. Hamstra, 2004 ABQB 156 (Can.
Alta.); R. v. Gray, 2007 NBQB 364 (Can. N.B.). 
In my first column I chose a very specific topic (recusal onthe basis of reasonable apprehension of bias) that easilyflowed over our shared border. In this column, I intend to
significantly broaden the analysis. 
Here I will examine what I describe as an evolution (or rev-
olution) that is occurring in the manner in which Canadian
trial judges render judgment and how they are reviewed on
appeal. Interestingly, this evolution is entirely free of any statu-
tory basis. I hope it will provide American judges some insight
into what is expected of their Canadian counterparts and cause
them to consider how the Canadian experience relates to their
own work and standards. 
THE SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS
A column does not provide space for a review of an entire
judicial system. So I intend to look at two changes that high-
light how Canadian judging is evolving, under the following
headings:
1. the requirement for reasons; and
2. the potential death of demeanour as a basis for the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses. 
Let us start with the requirement for reasons.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The provision of reasons by Canadian trial judges had tra-
ditionally been a source of little appellate court comment
because there was no such requirement at common law.1 For
instance, in 1994, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated in
R. v. Burns that a judge is “not required” to give reasons: 
Failure to indicate expressly that all relevant considera-
tions have been taken into account in arriving at a ver-
dict is not a basis for allowing an appeal . . . . This
accords with the general rule that a trial judge does not
err merely because he or she does not give reasons for
deciding one way or the other on problematic points.
The judge is not required to demonstrate that he or she
knows the law and has considered all aspects of the evi-
dence. Nor is the judge required to explain why he or
she does not entertain a reasonable doubt as to the
accused’s guilt. Failure to do any of these things does
not, in itself, permit a court of appeal to set aside the ver-
dict.2
Eight years later in R. v. Sheppard,3 a dramatic change
occurred. The Supreme Court of Canada would subsequently
say that its “approach to [the] question ha[d] evolved.”4
In Sheppard, the Supreme Court of Canada set aside a con-
viction on the basis that the trial judge’s reasons were insuffi-
cient. In doing so, the Court created what has been described
as a “freestanding error of law” justifying the setting aside of a
verdict solely on the basis of “inadequacy of reasons.”5 The
Supreme Court of Canada held in Sheppard that trial judges are
required “to state more than the result.”6 The Supreme Court
created the following common-law test for appellate determi-
nation as to whether a trial judge’s reasons are sufficient:
The trial judge’s duty is satisfied by reasons which are
sufficient to serve the purpose for which the duty is
imposed, i.e., a decision which, having regard to the par-
ticular circumstances of the case, is reasonably intelligi-
ble to the parties and provides the basis for meaningful
appellate review of the correctness of the trial judge’s
decision.7
This appears both simple and revolutionary in comparison
to Burns. Accordingly, after Sheppard, the issue of the adequacy
of trial judges’ reasons became a matter of significant appellate
consideration in Canada. Such questions as when will a judge’s
reasons be sufficient; what must reasons contain; and how
much or how little is required, were subjects of appellate
debate. The overturning of convictions on the basis of insuffi-
cient reasons was no longer uncommon.8
The issue became such a common basis for appellate inter-
vention in Canada that the Supreme Court granted leave to
appeal in a number of cases involving the adequacy of the trial
judges’ reasons. The results of these appeals have helped to
clarify the governing standards, but they also appear to consti-
tute a series of significant steps back from the bold initiative
the Supreme Court of Canada set out in Sheppard. Let me
explain. 
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The next appeal to reach the Supreme Court of Canada on
the issue of sufficiency of reasons was R. v. Gagnon.9 In Gagnon,
the Quebec Court of Appeal, relying on Sheppard, had set aside
a conviction on the basis that the trial judge’s reasons insuffi-
ciently dealt with credibility issues. The Supreme Court of
Canada, in reinstating the conviction, indicated that appellate
review of a trial judge’s reasons for assessing credibility must
be undertaken with the understanding that it can be “very dif-
ficult for a trial judge to articulate with precision the complex
intermingling of impressions that emerge after watching and
listening to witnesses and attempting to reconcile the various
versions of events.”10 Thus, reasons for credibility determina-
tions are not necessary, and appellate review should concen-
trate on whether there was a basis for the trial judge’s conclu-
sion. 
Similarly, in R. v. R.E.M.,11 the Supreme Court of Canada
reversed the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision to
overturn a number of sexual-assault convictions on the
grounds of inadequate reasons, in particular as regards the trial
judge’s failure to sufficiently refer to the accused’s evidence.
The Supreme Court did so despite noting that the trial judge in
convicting the accused “did not clearly explain which of the
offences were proved by . . . [the] evidence [that] had been
led.”12
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada commenced its
analysis in R.E.M. by declaring “that ‘it is now appropriate to
recognize that, in certain circumstances, the duty of procedural
fairness will require the provision of a written explanation for
a decision’. A criminal trial, where the accused’s innocence is
at stake, is one such circumstance.”13 The Court then stated:
In summary, the law has progressed to the point where
it may now be said with confidence that a trial judge on
a criminal trial where the accused’s innocence is at stake
has a duty to give reasons.14
However, the Court upheld the convictions, despite the fail-
ure of the trial judge to explain why he disbelieved the
accused’s evidence, on the basis that such an explanation was
not required:
[T]he trial judge’s failure to explain why he rejected the
accused’s plausible denial of the charges provides no
ground for finding the reasons deficient. The trial judge’s
reasons made it clear that in general, where the com-
plainant’s evidence and the accused’s evidence con-
flicted, he accepted the evidence of the complainant.
This explains why he rejected the accused’s denial. He
gave reasons for accepting the complainant’s evidence,
finding her generally truthful and “a very credible wit-
ness”, and concluding that her testimony on specific
events was “not seriously challenged” (para. 68). It fol-
lowed of necessity that he rejected the accused’s evidence
where it conflicted with evidence of the complainant
that he accepted. No further explanation for rejecting the
accused’s evidence was required.15
In R. v. Dinardo, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that
in “a case that turns on credibility, such as this one, the trial
judge must direct his or her mind to the decisive question of
whether the accused’s evidence, considered in the context of
the evidence as a whole, raises a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.”16 However, in R.E.M. (decided after Dinardo), the Court
said that trial judges may wish to “spare” an accused person
they are convicting from “unflattering” comments concerning
his or her credibility:
While it is useful for a judge to attempt to articulate the
reasons for believing a witness and disbelieving another
in general or on a particular point, the fact remains that
the exercise may not be purely intellectual and may
involve factors that are difficult to verbalize. Further-
more, embellishing why a particular witness’s evidence
is rejected may involve the judge saying unflattering
things about the witness; judges may wish to spare the
accused who takes the stand to deny the crime, for
example, the indignity of not only rejecting his evidence
and convicting him, but adding negative comments
about his demeanor. In short, assessing credibility is a
difficult and delicate matter that does not always lend
itself to precise and complete verbalization.17
WHAT IS REQUIRED OF CANADIAN JUDGES? 
In R.E.M., the Supreme Court answered this question by
stating that “what is required is that the reasons, read in the
context of the record and the submissions on the live issues in
the case, show that the judge has seized the substance of the
matter. Provided this is done, detailed recitations of evidence
or the law are not required.”18
Despite these comments, Canadian appellate courts contin-
ued to set aside convictions because of insufficient reasons. In
R. v. Clouthier,19 for instance, the Ontario Court of Appeal set
aside a conviction for robbery because the trial judge failed to
deal with certain portions of the evidence in convicting the
accused. The court indicated that
while trial judges are not required to make reference to
every piece of evidence, there is a duty to consider the
evidence in its entirety, not simply the evidence that
inculpates the accused. In my view, the failure to deal
with two items that tended to exculpate the appellant—
the balaclava and the evidence as to the height of the
robber—amounts to an error of law sufficient to justify
setting aside these convictions.20
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Similarly, in R. v. M.J.E.B.,21 the Alberta Court of Appeal
held that “where there is conflicting evidence on a key issue,
and the contradiction must be resolved by an assessment of
credibility, there is an obligation on a trial judge to explain
how he has resolved those contradictions in assessing reason-
able doubt.” As we will see, the Supreme Court of Canada
would reject this proposition a year later. 
Eleven years after Sheppard, the Supreme Court of Canada
returned to the sufficiency of reasons yet again, this time in the
case of R. v. Vuradin.22
In Vuradin, the accused was convicted of a number of sex-
ual offenses. The Supreme Court of Canada described the trial
judge’s reasons as “sparse” and “not directly” addressing the
accused’s evidence.23 However, the convictions were affirmed. 
The Supreme Court of Canada indicated that it found the
trial judge’s “sparse” reasons sufficient because
a trial judge’s failure to explain why he rejected an
accused’s plausible denial of the charges does not mean
the reasons are deficient as long as the reasons generally
demonstrate that, where the complainant’s evidence and
the accused’s evidence conflicted, the trial judge
accepted the complainant’s evidence. No further expla-
nation for rejecting the accused’s evidence is required as
the convictions themselves raise a reasonable inference
that the accused’s denial failed to raise a reasonable
doubt.24
Thus, it appears that when the evidence of a complainant
and the accused conflict, a Canadian trial judge is not required
to explain why he or she rejected the testimony provided by
the accused if the judge’s reasons demonstrate that where the
complainant’s evidence and the accused’s evidence conflicted,
the trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence. In R. v.
R.J.C.,25 the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated that the
accused was “entitled to know why his evidence was rejected.”
However, this comment simply cannot be reconciled with the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Vuradin.
Finally, though not a decision concerning the sufficiency of
reasons, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Cojocaru v.
British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health26 is a further
illustration of how the Court has diminished what it had
described as a “duty to give reasons.” 
In Cojocaru, the trial judge, in rendering judgment, repro-
duced in his reasons large portions of the written submission
of the plaintiffs’ counsel—321 paragraphs of the 368 were
copied from the plaintiffs’ written submission.  
The Supreme Court of Canada said:
[W]hile it is desirable that judges express their conclu-
sions in their own words, incorporating substantial
amounts of material from submissions or other legal
sources into reasons for judgment does not without
more permit the decision to be set aside. Only if the
incorporation is such that a reasonable person would
conclude that the judge did not put her mind to the
issues and decide them independently and impartially as
she was sworn to do, can the judgment be set aside.27
As to the judicial role and judgment writing, the Supreme
Court  declared that the “scope for judicial creativity is narrow,
but not non-existent.”28 The Court also indicated, somewhat
unkindly in my view, that “lack of originality alone [is not] a
flaw in judgment-writing; on the contrary, it is part and parcel
of the judicial process.”29
WHERE ARE WE NOW IN CANADA?
The debate over sufficiency of reasons has not ended. For
instance, in R. v. Labelle,30 the Ontario Court of Appeal set
aside a conviction because the trial judge failed to give “an
explanation of why” he did not have a reasonable doubt on the
basis of contradictions in the complainant’s evidence. Similarly,
in R. v. Kennedy, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, in setting
aside a conviction, referred to the trial judge having failed to
comment upon the “credibility” of the Crown’s main witness,
though the trial judge had made several comments upon the
“weight” of this witness’ evidence.31 This seems a rather weak
distinction. 
Shortly after Sheppard, one appellate court judge suggested
that the decision represented “a significant change in the law
with respect to a trial judge’s duty to give reasons.”32 However,
as we have seen, this did not turn out to be true. This is illus-
trated by the decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
in R. v. Crowley, in which the court held that a “successful
appeal from a verdict in a judge alone trial on the grounds
there were insufficient reasons, or the trial judge did not apply
the burden of proof, should be ‘rare.’”33
CONCLUSION (REASONS)
So, what can Canadian judges conclude from all of this?
What lessons should American judges take from the Canadian
experience? 
It is clear that reasons are required in a wide range of situa-
tions and that in providing reasons Canadian judges must
illustrate that they have seized the substance of the matter
before them; their reasons must be intelligible, allowing for
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appellate review of the reasoning process utilized. Having said
this, the standard required for reasons to be deemed sufficient
has been set at a very low level in Canada despite what
appeared to be a dramatic change after Sheppard.34 It is also
clear, despite the brief reference in R.E.M., that written reasons
are not required. This does not mean that written reasons do
not play an invaluable role in the administration of justice or
that judges should not be encouraged to write often, but that
is different from a requirement to write.35
It appears that when the evidence of a complainant and
the accused conflict, a Canadian judge is not required to
explain why he or she rejected the testimony provided by the
accused (even if “plausible”) if the judge’s reasons demon-
strate that where the complainant’s evidence and the
accused’s evidence conflicted, the trial judge accepted the
complainant’s evidence.36
This, of course, does not mean that a Canadian trial judge is
prohibited from explaining his or her reasons for rejecting a
“plausible” explanation provided by an accused person, and
there is great benefit to the administration of justice in judges
doing so, particularly in writing. A written judgment can add
significantly to a litigant’s perception of fairness.37 The impor-
tance of procedural fairness should not be underestimated. In
Laing v. R., the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council noted
(in the context of what reasons are required by appellate courts)
that the “guiding principle is one of fairness. The appellant is
entitled to be assured that his case has been properly considered
and to know why his appeal did not succeed.”38
I think a trial judge should have great difficulty, where an
accused person testifies at a trial and denies having committed
the offence, in rejecting his or her testimony without explain-
ing why.
Having considered the evolution of reasons for judgment in
Canada, let us now consider some recent Canadian develop-
ments in the use of a witness’ demeanour to assess credibility.
DEMEANOUR
In Canada, demeanour has traditionally been seen as having
an “intangible effect” on determining credibility.39 How does
the witness look while testifying? Do they make eye contact?
Are they nervous? What is their demeanour while testifying?40
These questions and consideration of such factors as “‘the tone
of [the witness’] voice, the look on his face, and any hesitation
he had in answering the questions’”41 have historically been
seen as important considerations for Canadian trial judges in
assessing credibility. In R. v. N.S., the Supreme Court of Canada
stated that it “is a settled axiom of appellate review that defer-
ence should be shown to the trier of fact on issues of credibil-
ity because trial judges (and juries) have the ‘overwhelming
advantage of seeing and hearing the witness—an advantage that
a written transcript cannot replicate.’”42 But we may be moving
away from such an approach in Canada. A recent example is the
Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Rhayel.43
THE CASES
In Rhayel, the accused was convicted of sexual assault. The
charge alleged that the accused retained the services of the com-
plainant, a sex worker, and sexually assaulted her when she
refused to have sexual intercourse with him without a condom.
The accused appealed from conviction, contending that the
trial judge erred by “overly relying on the complainant’s
demeanour in assessing her credibility.”44
The Ontario Court of Appeal suggested that there is 
a growing understanding of the fallibility of evaluating
credibility based on the demeanour of witnesses. It is
now acknowledged that demeanour is of limited value
because it can be affected by many factors including the
culture of the witness, stereotypical attitudes, and the
artificiality of and pressures associated with a court-
room. One of the dangers is that sincerity can be and
often is misinterpreted as indicating truthfulness.45
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The Court of Appeal indicated that “it is important for trial
judges to bear in mind that, to the extent possible, they should
try to decide cases that require assessing credibility without
undue reliance on such fallible considerations as demeanour
evidence.”46
The Court of Appeal concluded:
[T]he trial judge took an overly confident view of his
ability to assess the complainant’s credibility by refer-
ence to her demeanour. This reliance is particularly trou-
bling in the circumstances of this case because the
demeanour assessment was based on evidence that was
not subjected to contemporaneous cross-examination,
further weakening any possible value it had in assisting
the trial judge evaluate the complainant’s credibility.
In many cases, this error may not be of great moment.
But here, it mattered. Combined with the error of admit-
ting the videotaped statement for the truth of its con-
tents, this error provided the backdrop against which the
trial judge gauged the complainant’s and the appellant’s
account of what transpired when they engaged in sexual
activity in the car.47
Similar comments were made in a recent decision of the
New Zealand Court of Appeal. In R. v. Taniwha,48 the accused
was convicted of rape after a trial by judge and jury. On appeal,
he argued that the trial judge erred in failing “to give a tailored
direction relating to the evidential significance” of the com-
plainant’s “demeanour in the witness box.” The accused sug-
gested that there exists a “developed consensus as to the
importance of juries not placing undue significance on the
demeanour of a witness when assessing their reliability and
credibility.”49
The New Zealand Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
The Court of Appeal explained that “the risk is not so much
placing reliance on demeanour evidence per se. Rather, the real
risk arises through considering demeanour evidence in isola-
tion from other evidence and relevant factors.”50 However, the
Court of Appeal also agreed “that in light of the known poten-
tial for misinterpretation of visual or oral cues given by a wit-
ness, some modification is appropriate to the more traditional
jury directions on demeanour.”51 It recommended that juries
should be directed to consider the demeanour of a witness as a
“valuable aid” in assessing whether a witness is credible. Inter-
estingly, the court suggested that in a “she said/he said” type of
case, demeanour “may assume greater importance in the
absence of other factors such as inconsistency or any inherent
implausibility.”52
However, despite the strong language used in Rhayel,
reliance on demeanour in assessing credibility of witnesses is
far from dead in Canada. For instance, in the recent decision
of R. v. Crowley, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal indicated
that “deference is owed to a trial judge’s assessment of the evi-
dence, as they are in a ‘unique’ position to see and hear wit-
nesses.”53 Interestingly, two of the reasons provided by the trial
judge in Crowley for rejecting the accused’s evidence was that
he appeared “stressed” during his testimony and kept his
replies to a “bare minimum.”54 This hardly seems a basis for
disbelieving a person’s evidence.55
In R. v. B.G.G.,56 the Manitoba Court of Appeal made simi-
lar comments on the role of demeanor in assessing the credi-
bility of a witness. Their comments may be considered by some
as a reflection of an outdated approach:
This case is one wherein, as the judge correctly noted,
credibility is the core issue. In dealing with cases of this
kind, the trial judge is required to closely consider and
review the testimony given by the witnesses. That exer-
cise includes not only the evidence given, but his/her
observation of the conduct and demeanor of the wit-
nesses as they testify. Thus, the trial judge is in a much
preferred position to that of appellate judges in making
credibility findings. For this reason, demeanor conclu-
sions are virtually unassailable on appellate review, and
deference is owed to trial judges in respect of findings of
fact, even more so findings of credibility, and the draw-
ing of inferences based thereon.57
Interestingly, the Canadian Judicial Council in its model
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jury instructions (which are referred to in Taniwha) recom-
mends an approach that combines the nebulous reference to
“the witness’s manner” with a caution not to make it the “most
important factor” in assessing credibility:
What was the witness’s manner when he or she testified?
Do not jump to conclusions, however, based entirely on
how a witness has testified. Looks can be deceiving. Giv-
ing evidence in a trial is not a common experience for
many witnesses. People react and appear differently.
Witnesses come from different backgrounds. They have
different abilities, values and life experiences. There are
simply too many variables to make the manner in which
a witness testifies the only or most important factor in
your decision.58
CONCLUSION (DEMEANOUR)
So, what can Canadian trial judges learn from these deci-
sions, and what lessons can American judges take from them? 
Foremost, in my view, is that the days of Canadian trial
judges placing significant reliance on the demeanour of a wit-
ness in determining credibility may be over. A compelling
argument can be made that findings of credibility should be
made based on logic, rationality, and most importantly, the
quality of the evidence presented. Trial judges have experience,
but we do not have any magical powers or crystal balls to look
into the hearts of witnesses to determine if they are being
truthful. Thus, reliance on evidence, confirmation, and cor-
roboration may encapsulate a new approach to judging. The
dangers of relying on our impressions of witnesses’ demeanour
in the witness box to determine their truthfulness may (and
some would argue should) be coming to an end.
CONCLUSION
Obviously, judging is a role subject to significant changes as
the law unfolds. The Canadian experience in reasons and
demeanour suggest that that what is expected of a judge is
always evolving. Canadian judges will have to grapple with
these two issues for some time to come. 
Though presented separately, the issues of reasons for judg-
ment and the role demeanour plays in assessing credibility are
subtly intertwined. If reasons for conviction do not require an
explanation for the rejection of an accused person’s “plausible”
denial of wrongdoing, then no one will know if the trial judge
placed too much reliance on demeanour. As pointed out by the
Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. T.M.,59 reliance on demeanour
can lead to a trial judge drawing “inferences about a witness’s
credibility from the witness’s demeanour while that witness is
testifying . . . . even though the witness is not given an oppor-
tunity to explain any particular mannerisms while testifying.”
This would appear contrary to the essential nature of proce-
dural fairness. 
Hopefully for American judges, this column will be useful
in not only explaining the Canadian context, but in consider-
ing your own role as judges. 
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular col-
umn (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely pub-
lished. His latest article is Ours Is to Reason Why: The Law of
Rendering Judgment, 62 Criminal Law Quarterly 301 (2015).
Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to 
wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca. For United States judges who
may want to read in full one of the Canadian decisions referred to
here, you can contact Judge Gorman and he will forward a copy to
you by email. 
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